S
668 reform movement encountered in Sinkiang. The attempts at forced
423 cooperation resulted in many hard feelings and in violations of the
574 principles set forth by the government. Examples were cited of
474 "middle farmers" supplying carts or other tools, but not participating in the actual labor. Village cadres were unwilling to work on the cooperative farms lest their private interests suffer. Considerable difficulties were experienced in finding people who would accept responsibility. A partial solution was sought in sending more professional party workers to aid the cadres.

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*668 Similar reports are available from other parts of the North-
423 west. From these reports the following trends can be gathered:
474 (1) In the program of cooperativization the policy was to exclude not only the landlords but also the rich farmers. Since those who
S were not in the cooperatives would suffer social and economic os-
668 tracisim, the threat to all individual farmers kept out of the co-
423 operatives was great.
474 (2) The experience of those who did join the cooperative groups, however, was not happy. Their hard work often was not properly rewarded. It was difficult to keep the record of credits straight. This was the reason why many cooperatives collapsed.
(3) However, the average farmer, including the party cadre, dreamed of becoming a rich farmer and private businessman.

Against this background one can understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's drive for one million cooperatives in 1955. According to Mao's plan, by the spring of 1958 half of the agricultural population must be organized into cooperatives. In other words, by that time, half of the farmers in Northwest China would no longer be working on their own farms.

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*668 In the field of commerce and industry, the 3-anti and 5-anti
472 movements were the prelude to the program which calls for the total elimination of private enterprise.

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668 As described above, the political rights in the Chinese Soviet
472 days followed the conventional Communist Party line. But during
N the Second World War, the Chinese Communists had advocated
*668 their democratic government and democratic elections in the
666 border regions. Their procedure of a secret ballot included the following practices: "Each of the candidates' names is written on a bowl. The voter drops a bean or pea in the bowl bearing the name of his choice. If his election "unit" is entitled to more than one representative, he is given the proper number of beans. If a considerable number of the voters cannot read, the candidates are lined up, each carrying a well-calanced bowl or basket on his back. The voter drops his bean or beans into the bowl or bowls of his favorite candidate or candidates. The bowl is carried on the back to insure secrecy, so that no candidate knows who elects whom." (Hsu Yung Ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 59.)

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Table 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE PEASANTS IN THE NORTHWEST UP TO DECEMBER, 1953
(Based on Communist statistics)

	Total Population (1953 census)	Organized Farming Households Number	Percentage of total farming households	Mutual Aid Teams	Permanent Mutual Aid Teams Number	Percentage of Total No. of Teams	Agricultural Producers Cooperatives	State Farms
Northwest China	35,358,000	2,800,000	45 %				305	
Shensi	15,881,000	1,424,800	47 %	280,848	34,381	12.2%	234	93
Kansu (including Ninghsia)	12,929,000		45 %	194,400	19,400	10 %	32	50
Ninghsia (721,000)			53 %	13,615	2,535	16 %	19	-
Chinghai	1,677,000	96,000	52.3%	25,106	1,840	7.3%	10	-
Sinkiang	4,874,000	299,000	33.8%	51,600	(2,500)	5 %	10	-

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*175 leadership to mutual aid and cooperative organs in some places,
*668 a number of mutual aid teams ceased to exist. In Han-ch'eng
474 and Ho-yang, in Shensi, 20-30 per cent of such teams were sus-
[476] pended." As to agricultural cooperatives, the number increased from 1,970 or 1.32 per cent of the farming households in November 1954, to 17,000 or 16,83 per cent of the population by summer of last year. Plans are to increase the number fo 35,000 by 1957 to embrace 55 per cent of the households. However, by summer of last year (1955) too, the number of handicraft and supply and marketing cooperatives in Shensi embraced 13.64 per cent of the agricultural workers, and the 5416 credit cooperatives had a membership of 1,400,000 households, which was 45 per cent of the total farming households.

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[476] Kansu: in this province, where it was claimed that 57 per cent of the peasant population was organized, the number of mutual aid teams dropped from 245,300 in the spring of 1954 to 212,000 in 1955 and only a third of these was permanent. Due to "rightist ideology" of the cadres, the number of agricultural producers cooperatives also dropped from 7,419 in the fall of 1954 to 7,151 in spring of 1955. However, this was quickly rectified and by the end of the year, there were 16,849, embracing 23.43 per cent of the rural households and plans are to have 47,400 by 1957 to comprise 60 per cent of the households.

Chinghai: The 575 agricultural producers cooperatives at the beginning of 1955 embraced 80,000 households or 50 per cent of the peasant population. Sixty-seven per cent of the rural population was organized. (67.93 per cent)

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175 Sinkiang: Only five per cent of the 58,773 mutual aid teams in the
178 summer of 1954 were permanent. The number was increased to
• 474 75,275 embracing 63.32 per cent of the farming population, with
476 28.33 per cent of the teams permanent. The number of agricultural producers cooperatives rose to 1,702 by fall of 1955, but they occupied only five per cent of the cultivated area and their 47,328 households came to only 5.3 per cent of the farming population. The plans for 1957 are for 11,216 cooperatives to include 41 per cent of the households.

Only in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District was the collectivization more satisfactory. In the summer of 1955, there were 6,200 mutual aid teams and 243 cooperatives embracing 65 per cent of the farmers. The political organization of the rural population in Sinkiang was also behind the other provinces. According to Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 45,62 per cent of the farmers were organized in spring of 1955. (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

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Table 6. CADRES ASIGNED TO AND TRAINED FOR COOPERATIVE WORK

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	Total No. of Cadres	Number of Native Cadres	Cadres Assigned to Cooperatives	Cadres to be trained for cooperative work
Shensi			20,000	200,000
Chinghai	8,500	3,400	3,100	7,300
Sinkiang	51,000	34,400	27,000	
Kansu	(no figures available)			

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175 of the Communist hierarchy and externally by popular resistance.
177 The temporary setback in the program of collectivization in
668 Shensi and Kansu in 1954 had been attributed to the hostility of the peasants and the ineptitude of the cadres. As late as March, 1954, it was revealed that "the cultural standard of the cadres was low; only one in every three cadres could read.... The work of political propaganda and education of the peasants in some areas has not been carried out well and penetratingly enough." (Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956). One of the main reasons for the inertia of the cadres and party members, said Chang Chung-liang, secretary of the Kansu Chinese Communist Party committee, was their fear of the new situation created by the transition from New Democracy to socialism, which has been added to their rightist ideology. (NCNA November 2, 1955).

175 Besides the fear of the future, another demoralizing factor
668 was the unwillingness of the cadres and party members to leave
• 494 their positions in the governments and to work in the cooperatives
578 in the countryside, in defiance of the orders of their superiors. As Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party sub-bureau, pointed out: "The largest defect during the past year was the failure on the part of party committees of all levels to resolutely, effectively, and properly transfer the leadership center to rural work in mutual aid and cooperation. Certain defects also exist in our work in the nationalities and religious fields." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

175 The defects in nationality work were still charged to "the
668 vestiges of great nation chauvinism and local nationalism," caused
563 by "the practice of usurpation by Han Chinese coming from other
578 parts of China," and their disrespect to the minority cadres, and by the minority cadres who were "conceited, unwilling to study, refusing to observe discipline and doing things not according to policy and principle." (NCNA September 17, 1954.)

The incompetence and demoralization of the cadres and party members, who constitute the main working force of the Communists in the domination of the Northwest, and the discord and friction within their ranks went, pari passu, with the opposition of the people, to undermine the rule of the Chinese Communists. As in the past, popular opposition to the government was often carried on under the trappings of religion. In the Chinese inhabited
[494] areas of Shensi and Kansu, the Taoist secret society known as
[575] I-kuan-tao was still alive and active in the summer of 1955, and the farmers were required to sign pacts pledging to support the government in banning this sect.

175 Out in Sinkiang, pan-Islamism still gripped the mind of the
668 people who are predominantly Moslem. "Individual counter-revo-
669 lutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam," said Burkhan last
578 year, "and, putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out
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*668 collectivize was slight, but the speed toward socialization has
177 been increased greatly especially since the middle of 1955. The
plans call for a continuation in the breakdown of privately-owned
S farms. In Sinkiang the 1702 production cooperatives which existed
[668] in 1955 are to be increased to 3469 in 1956. By 1960, 85% of all
[177] households are scheduled to be at least semi-socialized. Further-
• [474] more, a relatively large number of mechanized state farms have
been instituted in the Northwest (China News Agency No. 112.).
It is not surprising that these rapid changes, combined with methods
of terror and intimidation, should result in peasant opposition.
(Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955.)

N 4. Religious organizations
*668 Religious organizations have also come under attack. Counter-
798 revolutionaries are suspected of hiding in them and of using them
669 for propaganda activities and espionage. Sinister anti-government
activities are attributed to the traditional secret societies, espe-
N cially I-kuan-tao, which has many branches throughout China and
*668 appears under various names. It is estimated to have 100,000
575 members in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. Secret society activities
have existed among the Chinese Moslems since Tso Tsung-t'ang's
invasion of the Northwest. Only now are they being suppressed.
It is unlikely that, after such a long existence, the Communists
will succeed in completely uprooting the organizations in the very
near future.

N C. Centers of Resistance Abroad
*668 It is clear that no effective organs of opposition can exist in
669 the Northwest under conditions of terror and in the face of a cen-
tralized system of police and military control. All that can be
expected is individual terror and sabotage - a method of opposition,
nevertheless, that continues to give the administration constant
irritation and worry. Moreover, if historical precedent can serve
as an indication for the future, a rebellious movement can attain
political significance only when military aid from abroad is avail-
able. This was the case during World War II, for instance, when
the Turks of southern Russia rebelled against the Soviet regime
and sided with the Germans. At present only two important cen-
ters of resistance exist abroad. One is the so-called National
Turkestanian Unity Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik
Quomitasinin), headed by its president, Veli Kayum Khan, a mem-
ber of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan; the other is Formosa, the
rallying point of all anti-Communists from the mainland.

1. The Turkestanian Unity Committee
N Few people in the West are aware of the existence of an East
*668 and West Turkistan government-in-exile, which is supported by
669 the Turks of Central Asia and by Turkestanian refugees. Due to
648 their fear of political entanglements with Russia, none of the

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242 The Soviet Union sent
668 thirty-three airplanes and large numbers of locust experts to
433 spray insecticides over an area of some 2,669,000 mow (or
[177] 405,688 acres) during 1952-1955. On the state farms, the Army
[475] has done the lion's share of the work of reclaiming land, building
[701] irrigation works, erecting experimental farms and stations and operating them. (Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955. p. 7, No. 9.)

654 The Communists reported that they have given financial and
668 technical assistance to the various nationalities who till the soil
241 or engage in pastoral activities. By the end of 1954, agricultural
175 loans totalling some 26,140,000 yuan (U.S. $1,061) and some 46,000 farming implements had been supplied to the peasants, enabling every peasant household to have one trowel of its own and every 1.3 households to own a plow. These small figures indicate that assistance has been meagre; but even this might enable the peasants to increase output as compared to output obtained by previous farming implements.

241 Whether agriculture will prosper in Sinkiang depends entirely
312 on the steps taken in water conservancy and the proper utilization
668 of water. Already five million additional mow of land (160,000
175 acres) have been irrigated in the past six years and the irrigated acreage in 1954 has been increased by 30.2 per cent since 1949. Reservoirs have been constructed like the well-known "Red Wild Goose Reservoir" and the "Peace Reservoir" which both now irrigate more than 237,000 mow (36,024 acres of land). Three
[475] state farms, collective farms, and a dozen or so agricultural co-
[474] ops have been formed in the area.

231 By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock in the whole
433 province numbered 17,105,000 head, an increase of 7.47 per cent
175 over 1953. (In 1947 the total number of livestock was 15,037,000.
668 The figure reported for 1954 indicates a 13 per cent increase.) The plan for 1955 is to raise the number fo 18,987,567 head, a net increase of 11 per cent. This will include 537,280 head of large and small animals of improved breed (including 515,792 sheep, 7,930 large domestic animals, 13,538 pigs); 2,839,140 head of livestock will be innoculated against or cured of various diseases. The Chinese Communists complain, however, of many defects in animal husbandry. During the past winters, insufficient feed was gathered and many animals died. It was estimated that some 200,000 died in the spring of 1954, an approximate loss of one per cent per annum.

313 The forestry policy has been to protect existent forests from
668 fire and damage, to survey forest areas suitable for afforestation, to plant saplings there, and to afforestate areas near rural villages for the development of co-ops and state farms. Each year, the quota mou to be afforestated is set and state departments undertake to meet these quotas. Nurseries have been built and seedlings planted in these tracts.

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668 training takes time before these technicians, accountants, etc.,
241 can go out and organize co-ops, operate them efficiently, and train other native cadres. The 1955 plan calls for the training of 600 technical cadres for the "Centers for Promoting Agricultural Techniques," for the training of 500 in-office cadres by rotation, and for the training of 4,190 accountants and 5,337 technicians for agricultural producer cooperatives.

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668 An additional problem (which will be mentioned at this point
657 rather than repeated when each province of the Northwest is dis-
736 cussed) concerns the soldiers' dependents in the region and the
• 494 plight of discharged army personnel. The State has been particu-
729 larly upset by the lack of participation of these groups in coopera-
[464] tivization and special attention is now being devoted to utilize this source of manpower. Since dependents of servicement are given certain State stipends, in food, many of them feel that by joining a cooperative they will be deprived of this compensation. Because 1955 was a critical year in the Five Year Plan, the pace of erecting new co-ops and consolidating the older ones has been increased. Now many of the dependents and demobilized soldiers who were organized in these co-ops have backed out of them and many of these co-ops have, therefore, never been consolidated. Another problem in the co-ops is that the members do not want partly disabled or female workers, and, on the other hand, many dependents feel that the State should provide for them. (No. 1004, March 10, 1955, Supplements. "Actively Organizing Servicemen's Dependents for Mutual Aid and Co-op Work." U.S. Consulate General. Survey of China Mainland Press.) The proper allocation of labor in the Northwest remains a critical problem.

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2. Chinghai

*175 By December, 1954, 575 agricultural producer co-ops had
*668 been formed, and this constituted 9.12 per cent of all households.
494 The number of mutual aid co-ops was not given but it was repofted
452 that 69. 7 per cent of all households had been cooperativized to
[476] some extent. There were also 159 supply and marketing coopera-tives, 148 credit cooperatives, and 12 handicraft producer co-ops. Long term low interest loans have been extended to poor peasants to encourage them to join farming co-ops. The first allocation totalled over 138 million yuan (U.S. $5,598). The interest rate is 0.4 per cent monthly and the repayment period is spread over five years. Besides these individual loans to poor peasants, there have been additional ones to enable the peasants to build small water conservancy works and buy new types of farm tools. All totalled, state loans amounted to more than 750 million yuan (U.S. $30,426) for 1955. (Far Eastern Economic Review. Dec. 1, 1955. pp. 686-87.)

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*668 In a provincial report by Chan Kuo-sheng, Secretary General
241 of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government, on work
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